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CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-SIGNATURE APPLICABLE TO ONLY PART 
OF A MEMORANDUM-Plaintiff buyer !.ought specific performance of an 
alleged contract for the sale of real estate. The instrument, denominated 
"deposit receipt," acknowledged receipt of the deposit, and then set forth 
the terms of the trade. This was signed "By Raymond Asmar," the alleged 
agent of the seller, in the place where the broker normally signs. Following 
this were two provisions. One, signed by plaintiff, stated that he agreed 
to purchase the property and that he confirmed the contract. A similar 
provision immediately following was not signed by defendant seller. The 
district court dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could 
be granted. On appeal, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting. The agree-
ment does not satisfy the Florida statute of frauds.1 Asmar did not sign 
as defendant's agent to sell; his signature merely acknowledged receipt of 
the money. Moritt v. Fine, (5th Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 128. 
Under statutes similar to the Florida statute requiring the memorandum 
to be "signed" by the party to be charged or his agent, the place of the 
signature is regarded as immaterial if the signature authenticates the 
whole memorandum.2 Once it is determined that there is a signature on the 
instrument, parol evidence is generally admissible to determine if it was 
intended to authenticate the entire instrument.3 Signatures have been 
held valid to satisfy the statute of frauds when found in the memorandum 
at the top,4 in the body/• in the place provided for the signature of a 
witness, 6 and even where part of the writing appeared below the sig-
nature.7 In similar fact situations, however, signatures have been held in-
valid both at the top8 and in the body.0 The unique element in the prin-
cipal case is that, although the agent's signature did appear on the 
1 2 Fla. Stat. (1955) §725.01. "No action shall be brought ••• upon any contract for 
the sale of lands ..• unless the agreement or promise upon which such action shall be 
brought, or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in writing and signed by the 
party to be charged therewith or by some other person by him thereunto lawfully au-
thorized." 
2 See 2 COIUlIN, CONTRACTS §521 (1950); 112 A.L.R. 937 (1938). 
s See 2 COIUlIN, CONTRACTS §520 (1950). 
4 Cohen v. Arthur Walker &: Co., 192 N.Y.S. 228 (1922); Wright v. Seattle Grocery 
Co., 105 Wash. 383, 177 P. 818 (1919). 
I> Wood v. Connor, 205 Ark. 582, 170 S.W. (2d) 997 (1943); Kilday v. Schancupp, 91 
Conn. 29, 98 A. 335 (1916). 
6 First Nat. Bank of St. Johnsbury v. Laperle, 117 Vt. 144, 86 A. (2d) 635 (1952); 
Felthauser v. Greeble, 100 Neb. 652, 160 N.W. 983 (1916). 
7 The Farmers Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Eastern Carolina Warehouse Corp. and 
Tobacco Growers' Cooperative Assn., 185 N.C. 518, 117 S.E. 625 (1923); Burns v. Garey, 
101 Conn. 323, 125 A. 467 (1924) (holdin~ weakened on this point since court held there 
was sufficient part performance to remove case from statute of frauds). 
s Mesibov, Glinert, &: Levy, Inc. v. Cohen Bros. Mfg. Co., 245 N.Y. 305, 157 N.E. 157 
(1927); Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corp., 33 Cal. (2d) 814, 205 P. (2d) 1025 (1949), noted 
in 34 MINN. L. REv. 277 (1950). 
o Guthrie v. Anderson, 47 Kan. 383, 28 P. 164 (1891), rehearing den. 49 Kan. 416, 
30 P. 459 (1892); Lee v. Vaughan's Seed Store, 101 Ark. 68, 141 S.W. 496 (1911). 
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instrument, the court disposed of the statute of frauds issue on a motion 
to dismiss. The dissenting judge argued vigorously that the statute required 
only a signing, and the signature of the agent did appear. Since the 
nature of the signature was equivocal, parol evidence was admissible to 
establish whether or not it was intended to authenticate the entire in-
strument, and hence the case could not be disposed of on the pleadings. 
The holding of the majority represents a conclusion that the nature of the 
signature was unequivocal, and it could be determined from the face of the 
instrument itself that the signature was not intended to authenticate 
the whole instrument. Several cases have presented situations similar to 
that in the principal case. Where a signed affidavit of financial qualifi-
cation of the sureties immediately followed an unsigned bond, the court 
in sustaining a demurrer determined that the signature to the affidavit 
did not execute the entire instrument; but the statute provided that no 
evidence of the agreement could be received other than the writing itself.10 
Where a signature appeared several times in reference to various clauses 
in the memorandum, it was held that the signatures did not authenticate 
the entire memorandum but had only a limited and particular effect.11 
In California, however, where the statute of frauds must be prima facie 
satisfied by looking only to the document itself, parol evidence of the 
intent to authenticate the whole instrument was held admissible where an 
unsigned declaration of homestead was followed by a signed verification 
clause.12 Since the money receipted for by the seller's agent in the principal 
case was in the nature of a down payment, the seller could reasonably have 
believed that the buyer thought the seller bound to the whole transaction. 
This could have been held a sufficient ambiguity to satisfy the parol evi-
dence rule. In holding that the signature in the principal case did not 
satisfy the statute of frauds and give grounds for admission of parol 
evidence, the Fifth Circuit has apparently gone farther than any other 
court. In view of the general rule that the specific location of the signature 
is immaterial and parol evidence admissible to show the intent to execute 
the entire memorandum, such a determination is justifiable only under 
peculiar circumstances. Such a finding would seem acceptable, however, 
when the signature on the instrument performs some separate and distinct 
legal function, it being much less probable in that case that it also served an 
additional purpose. Here, in acknowledging receipt of the deposit money, 
the agent's signature had such separate legal effect as to justify a deter-
mination that the signature was not intended, as a matter of law, to 
10 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Marden, 155 Ore. 29, 62 P. (2d) 573 (1936). The statute 
here required the name to be "subscribed," interpreted as a signature at the end of the 
writing, but since the name appeared at the bottom of the affidavit following the bond, 
the considerations should be the same as in the principal case. 
11 Caton v. Caton, L.R. 2 H.L. 127, 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 256 (1867). 
12 In re Kossack, (S.D. Cal. 1953) 113 F. Supp. 884. The statute here required the 
name to be "subscribed," but "subscribed" was interpreted as synonymous with "signed." 
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execute the entire instrument, and on that basis the court's ruling can be 
accepted. The Fifth Circuit's departure from the general approach should 
be strictly confined to this narrow area. 
George R. Haydon, Jr. 
